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Abstract:  
In the context of the proposed European CCCTB there is clearly a 
perceived need for the introduction of a common thin capitalization 
rule.  This rule would be aimed at dealing with inbound investment 
emerging from both third countries, and from Member States opting 
out of the CCCTB.  The principal aim of this paper is to establish 
whether such a need does indeed exist, and if so, which considerations 
should guide the design of a thin capitalization rule for the CCCTB.  
The paper starts by providing a broad summary of the varying 
approaches of Member States to thin capitalization.  It then makes 
the case for the introduction of a thin capitalization rule in the 
context of the CCCTB, from both an economic and a legal 
perspective, and sets out the general principles which should guide the 
design of such a rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A company is said to be ‘thinly capitalized’ when it has a high proportion of debt 
capital in relation to its equity capital.1  The significant differences that apply in most 
countries to the tax treatment of debt on one hand, and equity on the other,2 have 
made thin capitalization a popular method of international tax planning.  As a result, 
many, although not all, Member States apply anti-thin capitalization rules.  For years, 
however, this divergence in Member States’ treatment of thin capitalization has been 
acknowledged as a potential source of difficulties (not least of which, double taxation).  
Several commentators have therefore advocated (albeit to no avail) the harmonisation 
of thin capitalization as the ideal solution.3  Ironically, the CCCTB might, indirectly, 
accomplish just that.  In fact, within the context of the CCCTB, and assuming that 
debt and equity will remain subject to divergent tax treatments,4 there is clearly a 
perceived need for the introduction of a common thin capitalization rule.  Therefore the 
principal aim of this paper is to establish whether such a need does indeed exist, and if 
so, which considerations should guide the design of a thin capitalization rule for the 
CCCTB. 
The paper is divided as follows.  Part II provides a broad summary of the varying 
approaches of Member States to thin capitalization; ranging from non-existence of thin-
capitalization rules, to the application of very detailed, albeit divergent, rules.  In Part 
III we make the case, from both an economic and a legal perspective, for the 
                                                 
1 See International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), International Tax Glossary, 4th Edition, 
IBFD (2005) at p. 357. 
2 Alternative systems of taxing debt and equity, which essentially eliminate any differences in treatment 
between the two, have been suggested, and applied in practice by a minority of countries, including a few 
Member States, see A.J. Auerbach, M. Devereux and H. Simpson, “Taxing Corporate Income”, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP07/05, March 2007.  These alternative 
systems are, as follows: the Allowances for Corporate Equity, or ACE method; and the Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax, or its variant the Dual Income Tax, known as the CBIT method.  There is growing 
economic literature on both these methods; amongst the most recent are: A.D. Klemm, “Allowances for 
Corporate Equity in Practice”, IMF Working Paper Series, WP 06/259, November 2006; P.B. Sorensen, 
“Dual Income Taxation – Why and How?”, (2005) FinanzArchiv 61(4), 559-589; and D.M. Radulescu 
and M. Stimmelmayr, “ACE vs. CBIT: Which is Better for Investment and Welfare”, CESifo Working 
Paper Series, WP 1850, 2006. 
3 See O. Thoemmes, et al, “Thin Capitalization Rules and Non-Discrimination Principles – An analysis of 
thin capitalization rules in light of the non discrimination principle in the EC Treaty, double taxation 
treaties and friendship treaties” (2004) Intertax 32(3), 126-137, at pp. 136-137; and N. Vinther and E. 
Werlauff, “The need for fresh thinking about tax rules on thin capitalization: the consequences of the 
judgment of the ECJ in Lankhorst-Hohorst” (2003) EC Tax Review 2, 97-106, at p. 106. 
4 The European Commission has recently commissioned a study to the Centre for Business Taxation, 
University of Oxford on the economic effects of eliminating the tax differences between debt and equity, 
either by introducing an ACE, or alternatively, by introducing a CBIT, see Contract Award Notice 
TAXUD/2007/DE/322, 
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introduction of a thin capitalization rule in the context of the CCCTB,; and set out the 
general principles which, in our view, should guide the design of such a thin 
capitalization rule. 
 
II. MEMBER STATES’ THIN CAPITALIZATION RULES 
1. Current Approaches Towards Thin Capitalization 
At present, national practices towards thin capitalization diverge substantially across 
Member States.5  Not only do a considerable number fail to apply thin capitalization 
rules, but equally, amongst those that do, there are significant differences regarding the 
specific design of those rules, namely insofar as their scope and their effect are 
concerned.  In broad terms, Member States can be divided into three categories on the 
basis of their approach to thin capitalization: 
⎯ those which do not apply any thin capitalization rule; 
⎯ those which do not apply specific thin capitalization rules, but do apply other rules 
with similar effects; and 
⎯ the majority, which apply specific thin capitalization rules. 
1.1 No Thin Capitalization Rules 
Despite the growing popularity of these rules,6 as per 2007 data,7 seven Member States 
do not apply a thin capitalization regime: Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Malta, 
Slovakia and Sweden.8 
1.2 No Specific Thin Capitalization Rules 
From 1 January 2008 onwards, four Member States – Austria, Germany, Ireland and 
Luxembourg – do not have specific legislation against thin capitalization but apply 
measures, either through other tax rules, or administrative practice, which have a 
similar effect. 
                                                 
5 As acknowledged by the European Commission itself, see International Aspects in the CCCTB, CCCTB 
Working Group, Working Paper, Meeting to be held on 8 December 2005, CCCTB\WP\019, 18 
November 2005, at p. 14. 
6 See point III.1.1 below. 
7 In particular, see IBFD, European Tax Surveys database. 
8 It is worth pointing out that in Slovakia, thin capitalization rules were only abolished with effect from 1 
January 2004, see European Commission, Taxation Trends in the European Union – Data for the EU 
Member States and Norway, 2007 Edition, Eurostat statistical books, at p. 211. 
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1.2.1 Austria 
In Austria, the Administrative Court has established broad guidelines, which are used 
to determine whether from a commercial perspective the equity is adequate.  If it is not 
adequate, a portion of the debt to shareholders may be regarded as equivalent to 
shareholders' equity.  In addition, interest paid on loans, which are deemed to be 
‘disguised capital’, are treated as hidden profit distribution, and as such will not be 
deductible from the taxable income.9 
1.2.2 Germany 
Thin capitalization rules in Germany were introduced for the first time in 1994, but 
were subject to amendments in 2001 and then again in 2003; the latter in the aftermath 
of the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling.10  However, with effect from 1 January 2008, Germany 
no longer applies thin capitalization rules, but instead applies an alternative, the so-
called “earnings stripping rule”.  Similarly to the thin capitalization rules, the aim of 
this new rule is “to encourage financing by equity instead of debt capital, increasing 
German companies’ low equity ratios and stopping the shifting of profits abroad”.  The 
new rule appears to be considerably more restrictive than the previous thin 
capitalization rules, with the main motivation for the change, according to German 
authorities, being “to avoid the net tax revenue loss exceeding €5 billion.”11 
Under the earnings stripping rule, the maximum net interest deductions is limited to 
30% of earnings (before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization) and is applicable 
to German and foreign partnerships, sole traders and corporations.  Although, 
generally, businesses will be defined on an entity per entity basis, exceptionally, 
companies belonging to a German consolidated group can be regarded as one business.  
Interest expenses so disallowed can generally be carried forward indefinitely and may 
be used in future years in which a threshold of 30% is not exceeded.  Three exceptions 
for these new rules are applicable, as follows: 
                                                 
9 See P. Knörzer and Y. Schuchter, “Austria”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys.. 
10 For an analysis of the circumstances which led to 2004 amendments, see A. Korner, “The New German 
Thin Capitalization Rules: Tax Planning; Incompatibility with European Law” (2004) Intertax 32(8/9), 
401-415; T. Eckhardt, “Germany to Update on Thin Capitalization Regime” (2004) Tax Notes 
International 35, 124-126; W. Kessler, “Germany’s Expanded Thin Capitalization Rules Affect 
International Holding Structures” (2004) Tax Notes International 34, 67-71; O.F.G. Kerssenbrock, “Third 
Party Comparison in New Germany Thin Capitalization Law: is a ‘Fourth Party Comparison’ Required?” 
(2005) Intertax 33(4), 179-188; and R. Schonbrodt and U. Woywode, “Treatment of Secured Unrelated-
Party Loans Under German Thin Capitalization Rules” (2005) Tax Notes International 38, 145-150. 
11 See S. Ditsch and B. Zuber, “Germany: 2008 World Tax Supplement”, (2007) International Tax 
Review 18, 190-207. 
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⎯ the net interest expense of the German business is less than €1 million a year; 
⎯ the German business is not part of a group of companies; or, 
⎯ the business is part of a group and the equity ratio of the German business is not 
lower than the respective ratio of the overall consolidated group, so a 1% negative 
difference would not be harmful (the so-called escape clause). 
Another characteristic of the new rules is that, in the case of the disallowance of the 
interest, no withholding tax on a deemed dividend is triggered.12 
1.2.3 Ireland 
In Ireland interest paid to a 75% non-resident parent or co-subsidiary is disallowed and 
deemed to be a dividend in certain cases.  This does not apply to payments made: to 
companies resident in EU Member States, to companies resident in tax treaty 
countries; or (with effect from 1 February 2007) to companies resident in a non-treaty 
country, provided that the payment was made in the ordinary course of the trade of 
the paying company and the company elects for the payment not to be treated as a 
dividend.  In addition, subject to certain conditions, the deemed-dividend provision 
does not apply to payments of interest by banks to non-resident parent companies.13 
1.2.4 Luxembourg 
Finally, in Luxembourg, interest payments may be regarded as hidden profit 
distributions if the lending company is a shareholder of the borrowing company.  In 
practice, the tax administration applies a debt/equity ratio of 85:15 for the holding of 
participations.14 
1.3 Thin Capitalization Rules 
Although all other Member States currently apply specific thin capitalization rules, 
these rules vary according to the method adopted, their scope of application, and their 
effect.  However, the scope of application of these rules, in particular, diverges 
substantially. 
In terms of the basic methods used for determining the existence of thin capitalization, 
the two most common approaches – in an international context – are the arms’ length 
principle and the debt/equity fixed ratio.  Some countries also combine both methods, 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed analysis see ibid. 
13 See P. Bater, “Ireland”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
14 See J. O'Neal, “Luxembourg”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
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using the fixed ratio as safe harbour.15  Under the arm’s length method, a comparison is 
made between the actual financing structure, and that which would have arisen had 
the parties involved not been related.  The onus is on the taxpayer to prove that the 
same loan could have been obtained from a third party under the same circumstances 
and conditions.  What will constitute proof, may differ from country to country, but 
usually will include aspects such as interest rates, the extent to which the lender and 
borrower are related, a comparison of debt/equity ratio and also whether the loan is 
subordinate to the rights of other creditors.16  Application of a fixed debt/equity ratio 
is, in principle, the more straightforward method: under this method, tax consequences 
emerge where the debtor exceeds a certain proportion of its equity.  In practice, 
however, and as highlighted below, the fixed ratio method often operates in a much 
more complex fashion, as the application of the ratio is usually dependent on various 
other conditions. 
Within the EU, amongst Member States which currently apply thin capitalization 
rules, only the United Kingdom applies the arms’ length principle, and even then, only 
since 2004.17  All other Member States – who do apply thin capitalization rules – 
establish the existence of excess debt by reference to a fixed ratio of debt/equity, with 
some allowing taxpayers the opportunity to show that the transaction was made at 
arm’s length, as in the case of Italy. 
In terms of the scope of application of Member States’ thin capitalization rules, the 
differences are much more significant.18  Some rules appear to amount to a mere 
statement of principle – e.g. Hungarian and Romanian rules; whilst others are 
extremely detailed – e.g. French rules.  Some rules have a very wide scope of 
application, reflected in the application of either a strict fixed ratio – e.g. Belgium – or 
a low participation rule – e.g. Italy and Slovenia – or both – e.g. Germany’s regime 
until January 2008; whilst others seem to have a more limited scope of application – 
e.g. Czech Republic.  Some apply a general fixed ratio rule for all transactions; whilst 
others, apply more than one fixed ratio depending on the parties involved in the 
                                                 
15 See IBFD, International Tax Glossary, IBFD, 4th Edition (2005), at p. 357.  The OECD makes a 
distinction between two categories of thin capitalization rules: fixed and flexible. The first category, as 
the name indicates, includes rules which adopt a fixed debt/equity ration approach; flexible thin 
capitalization rules, on the other hand, are those which are able to take into account taxpayers’ individual 
circumstances, see Thin Capitalization and Taxation of Entertainers, Artistes and Sportsmen, Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs, Issues in International Taxation No. 2, Paris, OECD (1987). 
16 See L. Brosens, “Thin capitalization rules and EU law”, (2004) EC Tax Review 4, 188-213, at p. 190. 
17 See point II.1.3.16 below. 
18 See Table below. 
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transactions – e.g. Belgium.  Finally, various Member States limit further the 
application of these rules through the introduction of exceptions.  The most common 
exceptions are those applied to the Member States on the basis of the size of either the 
transaction (transactions below a certain amount are disregarded, e.g. France), or the 
overall turnover (companies with turnover below a certain amount are excluded from 
the scope of the thin capitalization rules, e.g. Italy); and those excluding financial 
institutions from the scope of the general rules, e.g. Hungary and Latvia. 
The impact of European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) rulings, and in particular that of 
Lankhorst-Hohorst,19 upon the scope of application of national thin capitalization 
provisions, is also note worthy.  Until 2002, most Member States applying thin 
capitalization rules (similarly to other OECD countries) limited its scope of application 
to situations of “inbound investment”, i.e. where the lender is a non-resident company.  
However, the release of the ECJ ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst, that same year, 
fundamentally changed this approach.  This case held that German thin capitalization 
rules, insofar as they applied exclusively to non-residents, contravene the freedom of 
establishment, as set out in the EC Treaty.20  In light of this decision, it became clear 
to many Member States that their own thin capitalization rules would not pass the so-
called ‘EU test’, and would be deemed to be in contravention of EU law, if they were 
so challenged.21  In order to ensure compatibility with EU law, in a post-Lankhorst-
Hohorst world, two avenues of action seemed available to Member States, as follows: 
⎯ to extend the scope of application of thin capitalization rules, in order to include 
resident companies; or 
⎯ to limit the scope of application of thin capitalization rules, in order to exclude EU-
resident companies.22 
                                                 
19 Albeit not exclusively, the influence of other ECJ rulings upon the national thin capitalization 
approaches is best highlighted by the case of the Netherlands, which until 2003 did not apply a thin 
capitalization rule but introduced one that year, reportedly in response to the ECJ ruling in Bosal Holding, 
18 September 2003, C-168/01, Bosal Holding BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, [2003] ECR I-9409.  
See M. de Wit and V. Tilanus, “Dutch Thin Capitalization Rules ‘EU Proof’?” (2004) Intertax 32(4), 
187-192; and A.C.P Bobeldijk and A.W. Hofman, “Dutch Thin Capitalization Rules from 2004 Onwards” 
(2004) Intertax 32(5), 254-261. 
20 Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt, [2002] ECR I-11779.  For a more 
comprehensive analysis of this ruling, as well of its potential impact upon the design of a thin 
capitalization rule for the CCCTB, see point II.2 below. 
21 See for example, for an account of the situation in Denmark, where thin capitalization rules were said 
to have “considerable similarities” to the German ones, but which would have been typical of many 
European countries, N. Vinther and E. Werlauff, EC Tax Review 2003. 
22 Immediately following Lankhorst-Hohorst, a third avenue was suggested: that Member States might 
react simply by dropping thin capitalization rules altogether and thus face “the full risk of base erosion”, 
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The reaction from Member States was not uniform.  Some Member States, such as 
Germany and Denmark, followed the first approach.23  Others, such as Spain and 
Portugal, followed the second.  This has led to further discrepancies in the scope of 
application of the various thin capitalization rules within the EU. 
As regards the effect of the thin capitalization rules, virtually all Member States, which 
apply thin capitalization rules, deem the excess debt to be non-deductible for tax 
purposes.  However, in addition, some Member States also re-characterise the interest 
as dividends for tax purposes, e.g. Belgium and Spain.24 
1.3.1 Belgium 
In Belgium, two rules are applicable to thin capitalization.25 First, a 1:1 debt/equity 
ratio applies to loans granted by individual directors, shareholders and non-resident 
corporate directors to their company. Interest relating to debt in excess of this ratio is 
re-characterized as a non-deductible dividend. Also, the interest rate must not exceed 
the market rate.  Second, a 7:1 debt/equity ratio applies to debt if the creditor 
(resident or non-resident) is exempt or taxed at a reduced rate in respect of the interest 
paid on the debt.  Interest relating to debt in excess of this ratio is considered a non-
deductible business expense.26  Until recently, interest could, under certain 
circumstances, also be re-characterised as dividends.27 
1.3.2 Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, the deduction of interest paid on loans taken from shareholders or third 
parties is limited to the total amount of interest income received by the company plus 
75% of its positive financial result (computed without taking into account interest 
                                                                                                                                               
see D. Gutmann and L. Hinnekens, “The Lankhorst-Hohorst case.  The ECJ finds German thin 
capitalization rules incompatible with freedom of establishment” (2003) EC Tax Review 2, 90-97, at p. 
96.  This concern, however, never seem to materialise; quite the opposite, as the overall number of 
Member States with thin capitalization rules has increased since 2002, rather than decreased. 
23 Although, some commentators were sceptical of whether this approach would indeed bring domestic 
laws in line with EU law, see O. Thoemmes et al, Intertax 2004, at p. 135; and A. Korner, Intertax 2004, 
at pp. 410 et seq. 
24 See for Spain, E. Cencerrado, “Controlled foreign company and thin capitalization rules are not 
applicable in Spain to entities resident in the European Union” (2004) EC Tax Review 3, 102-110. 
25 The fact that these rules are still in place in Belgium is interesting in itself, as Belgium is one of the few 
countries, and only Member State, which currently applies, since 2006, an ACE system of taxing equity 
and debt, see fn. 2 above. 
26 See R. Offermanns, “Belgium”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
27 The Belgian provisions, which required interest payments to be reclassified as dividends, where they 
were made to directors of foreign companies, but not where they were made to directors of Belgian 
companies, has been recently deemed to be in breach of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, see ECJ 17 
January 2008, C-105/07, NV Lammers & Van Cleeff v Belgische Staat (hereafter “Lammers”). 
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income and expenses).  However, the rules only apply if the borrowed capital of the 
company exceeds three times its equity. Interest on bank loans and interest paid under 
financial lease agreements are subject to thin capitalization rules only where the 
arrangement is between related parties. The interest expenses that have been non-
deductible under the thin capitalization rules in a tax year may be deducted in the 
following 5 years if the general conditions for the deduction (including thin 
capitalization rules) are met.28 
1.3.3 Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, interest paid on credits or loans provided by related parties in 
excess of the ratio 4:1 between the aggregate value of debt and all equity of the 
company is not deductible for tax purposes. The ratio for banks and insurance 
companies is 6:1.  Loans used for the acquisition of fixed assets and any interest-free 
loans are not treated as debt for thin capitalization purposes.29 
1.3.4 Denmark 
Thin capitalization rules apply to resident companies and to non-resident companies 
having a permanent establishment in Denmark,30 where certain conditions are met, e.g. 
where a controlled debt exceeds DKK 10 million.31  The main test of control is direct or 
indirect ownership of more than 50% of the share capital or direct or indirect control of 
more than 50% of the voting power. The thin capitalization rules apply if a company's 
debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 4:1.  Interest expenses relating to debt to controlling 
persons in excess of that ratio are not deductible. Capital losses on such debt are also 
not deductible.  Those losses may, however, be carried forward to be set off against 
future capital gains in respect of the same debt relationship. 
From 1 July 2007, two additional limitations apply. First, the deductibility of net 
financing expenses is limited to a cap computed by applying a standard rate of 6.5% 
(for 2007) on the tax value of the company's business assets as listed in the law. 
However, expenses below DKK 20 million are always deductible under this rule.  The 
second limitation is based on annual profits: the net financing expenses may not exceed 
80% of the annual taxable profits. 
                                                 
28 See K. Lozev, “Bulgaria”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
29 See T. Mkrtchyan, “Czech Republic”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
30 Thin capitalization rules amended in Denmark in 2004, to include application to resident companies, in 
light of the ruling Lankhorst-Hohorst, see N. Vinther and E. Werlauff, Intertax 2004. 
31 It is worth point out that Denmark is also currently introducing alterations to their tax treatment of debt 
and equity, which much resemble a CBIT type of system, see fn. 2 above. 
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If the debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1 is exceeded, a company can avoid the limitation on the 
deductibility of its interest expenses to the extent it substantiates that a similar loan 
relationship could exist between unrelated persons.  Non-deductible interest expenses 
are not re-characterized as distributions of profits, i.e. dividends.32 
1.3.5 France 
In France, new thin capitalization rules are applicable since 1 January 2007.33 The new 
rules apply to ‘associated companies’.  Two companies are ‘associated companies’ if (a) 
one of them has a direct or indirect holding of a minimum of 50% in the capital of the 
other or controls the other company de facto; or (b) a third company has a direct or 
indirect holding of a minimum of 50% in the capital of the two companies, or exercises 
a de facto control over the two companies.  The deductibility of interest paid to 
associated companies will be limited by the application of two tests:  
⎯ the overall indebtedness (related party debt-to-equity ratio) of 1.5:1. This ratio is 
determined by comparing the loans from the associated companies with the equity 
capital of the borrower; and  
⎯ the ratio of the interest paid to the realized profits of the company (the borrower?). 
Interest exceeding the higher of the above limits will not be tax deductible, but can be 
carried forward within certain limits.  Moreover, the interest deduction will be reduced 
by 5% annually from the second year of the carry-forward period.  As a safe haven 
measure, interest will be fully deductible if the company (the borrower) can 
demonstrate that its own total debt (related and third-party) does not exceed the 
worldwide group's debt.  Furthermore, the interest limitations will not apply to certain 
financial transactions and to small transactions the non-deductible interest of which is 
less than EUR 150,000.34 
 
 
                                                 
32 See E. Nilsson, “Denmark”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
33 Discussions regarding the potential need to review French thin capitalization rules in light of 
Lankhorst-Hohorst, start emerging immediately following the release of that ruling, see O. Roumelian, 
“The End of French Thin Capitalization Rules?” (2003) Intertax 31(6/7), 244-247.  However, the review 
process was somewhat prolonged and only in 2007 did the new thin capitalization rule come into force, 
see O. Dauchez and G. Jolly, “Thin Capitalization in France: A Story Still in the Making” (2004) Tax 
Notes International 35, 719-722; and M. Collet, “France to Reform Thin Capitalization Rules” (2005) 
Tax Notes International 40, 119-122. 
34 See S. Baranger, “France”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
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1.3.6 Hungary 
In Hungary, where debt exceeds three times the company's equity, the excess interest 
paid by a company is not tax deductible.  This rule does not currently apply to 
financial institutions.35 
1.3.7 Italy 
Italy only introduced thin capitalization rules in 2003.36  These rules apply always to 
holding companies and also to companies whose turnover exceeds EUR 7.5 million.  If 
during the tax year, the average debt exceeds four times the adjusted equity with 
reference to a qualified shareholder or its related parties, the consideration on the 
excessive loans granted or guaranteed, directly or indirectly, by a qualified shareholder 
or its related parties is not deductible for tax purposes and, if received by a qualified 
shareholder, is re-characterized as a dividend.  In determining the debt/equity ratio, 
loans granted or guaranteed by the shareholder's related parties should be taken into 
account.  
For thin capitalization purposes, a ‘qualified shareholder’ is a shareholder that directly 
or indirectly controls the debtor according to the Civil Code or owns at least 25% of 
the share capital of the paying company.  ‘Related parties’ are defined as companies 
that are controlled according to the Civil Code or relatives as defined in the tax law.  
Thin capitalization rules do not apply if the overall debt/equity ratio with reference to 
all qualified shareholders and their related parties does not exceed 4 to 1, or if the 
debtor proves that the excess debt is justified by its own credit capacity, and so that 
also a third party would have granted it.37 
1.3.8 Latvia 
With effect from 31 December 2002, thin capitalization restrictions apply in Latvia.  
Interest payable is disallowed to the extent that the associated liabilities exceed four 
times the equity capital of the company at the beginning of the taxable period 
concerned, as reduced by the fixed asset revaluation reserve and other reserves not 
formed from distributable profits. Where a company would otherwise suffer a reduction 
in interest allowable as a result of this rule and the general restriction on interest 
payable, only the larger of the reductions is made. 
                                                 
35 See R. Szudoczky, “Hungary”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
36 For a comprehensive analysis of these new provisions, see M. Rossi, “Italy’s Thin Capitalization 
Rules” (2005) Tax Notes International 40, 89-100.  See also A. Circi and M. Di Bernardo, “Italy Issues 
Guidelines on Thin Capitalization” (2005) Tax Notes International 38, 1038-1043. 
37 See G. Chiesa, “Italy”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
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This rule will not apply to interest paid by credit institutions or insurance companies 
or in respect of borrowings, loans or leasing services provided by credit institutions 
registered in Latvia or another EU Member State, the Latvian State Treasury, the 
Nordic Investment Bank, the World Bank Group or (since 1 January 2007) a resident 
of Latvia.38 
1.3.9 Lithuania 
Under Lithuanian thin capitalization legislation, interest and currency exchange losses 
on the debt in excess of the debt/equity ratio of 4:1 are non-deductible for tax 
purposes. This is applicable in respect of the debt capital provided by a creditor, who:  
⎯ directly or indirectly holds more than 50% of shares or rights (options) to 
dividends; or  
⎯ together with related parties, holds more than 50% of shares or rights (options) to 
dividends, and the holding of that creditor is not less than 10%.  
This rule is not applicable where the taxpayer proves that the same loan could exist 
between unrelated parties.  Financial institutions providing leasing services are also 
excluded from the scope of this rule.39 
1.3.10 Netherlands 
Under Dutch thin capitalization rules, introduced in 2004,40 the deduction of interest is 
restricted with regard to loans provided by a taxpayer to a group company or related 
company excessively financed by debt capital.  ‘Group company’ is defined as a 
company that is part of an economic unit in which legal entities are linked 
organizationally. ‘Related company’ is defined as a company in which the taxpayer has 
a participation of at least one third or a third company that holds a participation of at 
least one third in the taxpayer. 
A company is deemed to be excessively financed by debt capital if its average annual 
debt exceeds a 3:1 debt/equity ratio for tax purposes and the excess is greater than 
EUR 500,000. Equity is determined in accordance with Netherlands tax law and does 
not include tax-allowable reserves. Companies may, however, opt that the excessive 
debt is determined by multiplying the difference between the average annual debts and 
the average annual equity using a multiplier based on the commercial debt/equity ratio 
                                                 
38 See Z.G. Kronbergs, “Latvia”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
39 See R. Degesys, “Lithuania”, point A.7.3, IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
40 See point II.1.3 above. 
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of the group. The multiplier is equal to the average annual debts divided by the 
average annual equity as included in the consolidated accounts of the group. The 
maximum non-deductible interest is the amount of the interest paid on loans provided 
by related companies less the interest received from related companies on loans 
provided to those companies. 
The thin capitalization rule applies to resident companies, non-resident companies with 
a permanent establishment in the Netherlands and foreign permanent establishments, 
which are treated as a distinct and separate entity.41 
1.3.11 Poland 
In Poland, under the current thin capitalization rules,42 interest paid on a loan is not 
deductible if a debt/equity ratio of 3:1 is exceeded and the loan is granted by either of 
the following: 
⎯ a shareholder owning at least 25% of the share capital or by a group of shareholders 
owning in aggregate at least 25% of the share capital; or  
⎯ between companies in which another company owns at least 25% of the share 
capital.43 
1.3.12 Portugal 
In Portugal, as a general rule, interest paid by a resident company in respect of 
excessive debt to a non-resident related party is not deductible.  Two companies are 
deemed to be related parties for thin capitalization purposes if one is in a position to 
exercise directly or indirectly a significant influence over the management of the other. 
The related party test is triggered, in particular, in situations involving:  
⎯ a company and its participators who hold directly, or together with family members 
or a 10%-associated entity, at least 10% of the capital or voting rights in that 
company; 
                                                 
41 See R. Offermanns, “Netherlands”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
42 The evolution of the scope of thin capitalization rules in Poland is somewhat interesting.  Introduced in 
1999, Polish rules applied initially to both residents and non-resident entities; the scope of these rules had 
however been amended in 2001, limiting their application to non-resident companies.  In 2004, and in 
light of the ECJ ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst, Poland had to return to their initial formulation, to include 
both resident and non-resident companies within the scope of their thin capitalization provisions.  See R. 
Dluska, “Poland: How the new thin-capitalization rules work”, (2005) International Tax Review, May. 
43 See M. van Doorn-Olejnicka, “Poland”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
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⎯ two companies in which the same participators hold directly, or together with 
family members or a 10%-associated entity, at least 10% of the capital or voting 
rights; 
⎯ a company and its directors (including any member of its board of directors or 
supervisory board) or their family members;  
⎯ two companies in which the majority of the directors (including any member of 
their board of management or supervisory board) are either the same individuals or 
members of their family; 
⎯ companies under unified control or managerial subordination. Unified control exists 
if a group of companies is subject to a unified and common management; a 
managerial subordination exists if a company entrusts the management of its 
business to another company;  
⎯ a parent company and its 90% or more owned subsidiaries;  
⎯ companies which, due to their commercial, financial, professional or legal links, are 
interdependent in carrying on their business; or  
⎯ a resident company and an entity that is a resident of a listed tax haven, 
irrespective of any holding relationship. 
Excessive debt is the part of the total debt, with non-resident related parties, which 
exceeds twice the amount of the corporate borrower's net worth held by such non-
residents. However, interest on excessive debt may be deducted, except where the 
borrower is a resident of a listed tax haven, if the taxpayer can prove (on the grounds 
of the kind of activity, the sector in which operates, its size, or any other relevant 
criteria, and provided that the risk factor in the transaction does not involve any 
related party) that the loan conditions are comparable to those agreed by non-related 
parties in comparable transactions under the same circumstances.44 
From 1 January 2006, Portuguese thin capitalization rules do not apply to EU resident 
entities.45 
1.3.13 Romania 
                                                 
44 See P. Dias de Almeida, “Portugal”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
45 For a comprehensive analysis of the Portuguese thin capitalization rules, see F. Sousa da Camara and J. 
Almeida Fernandes, “Thin Capitalization Rules” (2007) International Transfer Pricing Journal 2, 119-
123.  See also, F. Sousa da Camara, “Thin Capitalization Rules Violated EC Treaty, Lisbon Court Says” 
(2006) Tax Notes International 44(4), 272-274; and F. Sousa da Camara, “Portugal Enacts Safe Haven 
Exception to Thin Capitalization Rules” (1996) Tax Notes International, 585. 
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In Romania, interest and foreign exchange losses relating to long-term loans taken from 
entities other than authorized credit institutions (including leasing companies) are not 
deductible if the debt/equity ratio exceeds 3:1. Any excess interest may be carried 
forward until full deductibility is reached.46 
1.3.14 Slovenia 
Until 2007, Slovenian thin capitalization rules established that interest on loans taken 
from shareholders holding, directly or indirectly, at least 25% of the capital or voting 
rights of the taxpayer, was tax deductible only if the loan did not exceed eight times 
the value of the share capital owned. The debt/equity ratio, however has changed in 
2008 to 6:1; this ratio will apply until 2010, and then change again to 5:1 in 2011 and 
finally to 4:1 from 2012 onwards. However, if the taxpayer proves that the excess loan 
could be granted also by a non-related entity, the thin capitalization rules do not 
apply.  Loans granted by a shareholder also include loans granted by third parties if 
guaranteed by the shareholder, and loans granted by a bank if granted in connection 
with a deposit held in that bank by the shareholder.47 
1.3.15 Spain 
As with many other Member States, Spain introduced substantive amendments to its 
thin capitalization rules in the wake of the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling.48 If the average 
total (direct and indirect) loans made to a company resident in Spain (other than those 
subject to special debt/equity ratio requirements), by a non-EU resident related 
company, during the tax year is more than three times the amount of the borrower's 
average net worth in that year (excluding profits of the period), the amount of interest 
attributable to the excess will be re-characterized as a dividend for tax purposes (i.e. it 
cannot be treated as a deductible expense and is subject to dividend withholding tax).  
A different ratio may be applied if the taxpayer so requests and the lender does not 
reside in a listed tax haven.49 
1.3.16 United Kingdom 
With effect from 1 April 2004, the thin capitalization rules are repealed and replaced 
by new legislation that forms part of the extended transfer pricing regime.  Previously, 
excess interest payments from thinly capitalized resident companies could be treated as 
                                                 
46 See R. Badea, “Romania”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
47 See J. Dolšak, “Slovenia”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys. 
48 See point II.1.3 above. 
49 See A. de la Cueva González-Cotera and E. Pons Gasulla, “Spain”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European 
Tax Surveys. 
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dividend payments. Only the excess of what would have been paid between 
unconnected parties dealing at arm's length, having regard to the debt/equity ratio, 
rate of interest and other terms that would have been agreed, was treated as a 
dividend. There was no fixed debt/equity ratio, but a ratio of 1:1 was normally 
acceptable.  The rule applied only to 75% subsidiaries, or where both the paying and 
the recipient companies were 75% subsidiaries of a third company.50  After the 
Lankhorst-Hohorst decision, however, it was feared that this legislation would be in 
contravention of EU law, and thus a total overhaul of the thin capitalization regime 
was envisaged. 
Being part of the transfer pricing regime has significant consequences in terms of 
method, scope and effects of thin capitalization.  Two of the most importance 
consequences are the following.  First, the decision as to whether thin capitalization is 
taking place is assessed on a case-by-case basis; in considering whether the conditions of 
a load respect arm’s length conditions, several factors should be taken into 
consideration, including: the amount of the loan, whether the loan would have been 
done if the companies involved were not related; and, the interest rate applied.  Second, 
interests are no longer treated as distribution. 
Excluded from the scope of these new rules are small and medium size companies in 
respect of transactions made between related parties, resident in the United Kingdom 
or in a country with which the United Kingdom has signed a double taxation treaty.51 
 
Table 1 below is a summary of Member States’ different approaches to thin 
capitalization, as well as the basic characteristics of existing thin capitalization rules 
within the EU where available. 
 
                                                 
50 See P. Bater, “United Kingdom”, point A.7.3, in IBFD, European Tax Surveys.  For a detailed analysis 
of the United Kingdom’s previous thin capitalization regime, see A.K. Rowland, “Thin Capitalization in 
the United Kingdom” (1995) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 49(12), 554-558. 
51 See L. Brosens, EC Tax Review 2004, at p. 202; and J. Vanderwolk, “Finance Act Notes: transfer 
pricing and thin capitalization – sections 30-37 and Schedule 5” (2004) British Tax Review 5, 465-468. 
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TABLE 1: MEMBER STATES’ APPROCHES TO THIN CAPITALIZATION 
  Method Used Scope Effect 
 Thin Capitalization 
Rule 
Arms’ Length 
Principle 
Fixed Ratio Debt/Equity Ratio Participation Rule Excess Debt Non-
Deductible 
Interest Re-characterised 
as Dividend 
Austria Yes52     × × 
Belgium Yes  × 1:1 / 7:1  × × 
Bulgaria Yes  × 3:1  ×  
Cyprus No       
Czech Republic Yes  × 4:1 / 6:1  ×  
Denmark Yes  × 4:1 50% ×  
Estonia No       
Finland No       
France Yes  × 1.5:1 50% ×  
Germany No53     ×  
Greece No       
Hungary Yes  × 3:1  ×  
Ireland Yes54    75%  × 
Italy Yes  × 4:1 25% × × 
Latvia Yes  × 4:1  ×  
Lithuania Yes  × 4:1 50% ×  
Luxembourg Yes55  × 85:15    
Malta No       
Netherlands Yes  × 3:1 33% ×  
Poland Yes  × 3:1 25% ×  
Portugal Yes  × 2:1 10% / 90% / Other ×  
Romania Yes  × 3:1  ×  
Slovakia No       
Slovenia Yes  × 6:1 25% ×  
Spain Yes  × 3:1  × × 
Sweden No       
United Kingdom Yes ×      
                                                 
52 No specific thin capitalization rule, but guidelines set out by the Austrian Administrative Court. 
53 Thin capitalization rules have been substituted by a new “earnings stripping rule”, with effect from 1 January 2008. 
54 No specific thin capitalization rule, but rules emerge from general tax provisions. 
55 No specific thin capitalization rule, but rules emerge from administrative practice. 
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III. THIN CAPITALIZATION RULE FOR THE CCCTB 
As already discussed,56 the introduction of a thin capitalization clause has been 
perceived as a fundamental aspect of combating tax avoidance within the context of 
the CCCTB.57  However, prior to introducing such a clause, consideration must be 
given to both the economic and legal dimensions of thin capitalization clauses. 
1. Economic Considerations 
Introduction of a thin capitalization clause, within the context of the CCCTB, should 
be preceded by consideration of its economic consequences.  In particular it should be 
asked, first, whether from an economic perspective thin capitalization rules are in fact 
necessary; and second, whether there is evidence of their economic impact, and if so, of 
what type.  This is particularly true for those Member States, which at present do not 
apply thin capitalization rules.58  These Member States will in effect, by virtue of the 
CCCTB, apply a new thin capitalization rule, and as such, consideration of its 
potential impact upon their economy appears to be of special relevance. 
1.1 Thin capitalization phenomenon from an economic perspective 
Thin capitalization is one well-known, and generally thought to be common, method of 
international profit shifting.  What is less well known however, is exactly how common 
it is, i.e. to what extent is (or is not) thin capitalization a widespread phenomenon.  
Unfortunately, although the causes, manifestations and effects of profit shifting are well 
documented within economics literature, the same cannot be said of thin capitalization 
in particular. 
Notwithstanding the above, the last few years have seen an emerging body of work 
within economics dealing with this matter.  These studies seem to suggest that thin 
capitalization is indeed a significant phenomenon within the international sphere.59  In 
2003, R. Altshuler and H. Grubert found, using available data from the United States 
of America (US), that 1% higher tax rate in foreign affiliates of US multinationals 
raises the debt/equity ratio in those affiliates by 0.4%.60  One year later, a study 
                                                 
56 See point 1 (Introduction) above. 
57 See European Commission’s Working Papers: Related Parties in CCCTB, CCCTB Working Group, 
Working Paper, Meeting to be held on 13 December 2006, CCCTB\WP\041, 5 December 2006; and also 
Dividends, CCCTB Working Group, Working Paper, Meeting to be held on 12 September 2006, 
CCCTB\WP\042, 28 July 2006, at p. 6. 
58 See point 2.1 above. 
59 For a comprehensive survey of these studies, see R.A. de Mooij, “Will Corporate Income Taxation 
Survive?” (2005) De Economist 153(3), 277-301, at p. 292. 
60 See “Taxes, repatriation strategies and multinational financial policy” (2003) Journal of Public 
Economics 87, 73-107. 
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conducted by three other American academics confirmed these findings: a 10% increase 
in the tax rate can have an impact of 3-5% higher debt/equity ratio.61  A similar study 
for Europe was conducted in 2006 by H. Huizinga, L. Laeven and G. Nicodeme.  
Looking at evidence collected from over 90,000 subsidiaries, across thirty-one European 
countries, they found that an increase in the effective tax rate of 0.06% in the 
subsidiary’s country, will result in a 1.4% increase in its debt over total assets ratio.62  
The results of this study confirm those of an earlier research, conducted by A. 
Weichenrieder, in 1996, which gave an early indication of the potential dimension of 
the problem in Germany.  The study shows that in the early 1990s (prior to the 
introduction of a thin capitalization rule in Germany),63 more than three quarters of 
German inward foreign direct investment consisted of loans, while German investment 
abroad consisted primarily of equity.64 
The adverse consequences, in terms of collected revenue, of such a widespread 
phenomenon are obvious.  When seen in this context, it is therefore hardly surprising 
that the introduction of thin capitalization rules is on the increase, not only within the 
EU,65 but more generally, amongst OECD countries.66  The two-fold aims of these rules 
are clear: to curtail international tax planning, and consequently, to increase revenue.  
From an economic perspective, however, it does not seem to be at all obvious that 
attempts to restrict any type of tax planning are effective in the long term.  
Furthermore, even if they are, it is unclear either whether businesses’ response to such 
restrictions are, more generally, economically beneficial for the imposing country.67 
A review of the economic effects of thin capitalization rules should therefore, start by 
considering whether the stated aims of these rules have been achieved, and then, 
moving beyond those aims, assess what would be the overall effects for the economy of 
the imposing country, as a whole. 
1.2 Economic effects of thin capitalization rules 
                                                 
61 M.A. Desai et al, “A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and International Capital 
Markets” (2004) The Journal of Finance LIX(6), 2451-2487. 
62 See “Capital Structure and International Debt Shifting”, CEB Working Paper Series, WP 07-015, 2007 
63 See point II.1.2.2 above. 
64 See “Fighting international tax avoidance: the case of Germany” (1996) Fiscal Studies 17, 37-58. 
65 The number of Member States which apply a thin capitalization rule appears to have been steadily 
increasing in the last ten years, for comparison purposes see R.A. Sommerhalder’s 1996 overview in 
“Approaches to Thin Capitalization” (1996) European Taxation 3, 82-93.  See also general comments by 
O. Thoemmes et al, Intertax 2004, at pp. 127-128. 
66 T. Buettner et al note that whilst in 1996 only half of the OECD countries applied a thin capitalization 
rule, by 2004 that number had increased for almost 75%, see “The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on 
Multinationals’ Financing and Investment Decisions”, CESifo Working Paper Series, WP No. 1817, 
October 2006, at p. 2. 
67 See ibid, at p. 1. 
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The effectiveness (or not) of thin capitalization rules has been the subject of a few 
recent economic studies, all of which originating in Germany.68  In 2006, a team lead by 
T. Buettner found, based on a survey of all OECD countries, that there was a definite 
correlation between the application of thin capitalization rules and the financial 
structure of multinationals.69  The findings were confirmed, and further developed, in a 
further study by M. Overesch and G. Wamser, released the following year.70  Using 
German inbound investment data from 1996 to 2004, the latter study considers 
whether thin capitalization rules effectively restrict the tax planning behaviour of 
multinationals.  German legislative amendments to the rules in 2001 and 2004 are 
exploited in order to detect differences in business behaviour.  The study found that 
consideration of thin capitalization rules is crucial for multinationals’ capital structures, 
i.e. they induce significantly lower internal borrowing.  In particular, the findings 
suggest that some companies, where affected by a stricter thin capitalization rule, 
subsequently adjusted their capital structure.  Thus, the authors concluded that thin 
capitalization rules are indeed effective in restricting multinationals’ profit shifting, 
even in high-tax countries such as Germany. 
Yet another group of German economic researchers is currently taking these studies 
one step further, by assessing the effects of these findings in terms of company’s 
efficiency levels.  The premise is that, if thin capitalization rules can indeed reduce the 
debt/equity ration, then, it will not only prevent tax planning, but theoretically, they 
can also bring firms’ decisions closer to optimal efficiency levels.  At present, however, 
there is no definite evidence that this will be the case in practice.71 
In light of the above, and despite the scarcity of studies in this area, it seems therefore 
that thin capitalization rules are indeed effective, in terms of their aims.  However, 
even if this is the case, the question still remains as to whether there are negative 
economic consequences to introducing thin capitalization, which might potentially deem 
their introduction to be non-beneficial, for the economy of a country as whole.  Of 
particular concern here, is the eventual impact of thin capitalization rules on levels of 
investment. 
                                                 
68 One potential explanation for the special interest from German economists in the topic, is that, as 
opposed to most other Member States, Germany has substantially amended its thin capitalization rules 
various times over the last fifteen years, thus providing a better comparative framework for understanding 
the economic impact of thin capitalization rules. 
69 See CESifo Working Paper Series 2006. 
70 Paper dated September 2007, to be published as “Corporate Tax Planning and Thin-Capitalization 
Rules: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment”, (2008) Applied Economics (in press). 
71 See A. Haufler and M. Runkel, “Thin Capitalization rules: Do they yield a double dividend or do they 
promote corporate tax competition?”, Presentation at European Tax Policy Forum (ETPF) Meeting, 18 
October 2007, Madrid. 
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Although not much has been said on the economic effects of thin capitalization, and 
the rules to combat them specifically, there is a relatively well established literature on 
the economic effects of anti international tax planning policies.  In this regard, 
theoretical economic studies have tended to conclude that, imposing restrictions on 
certain types of international tax planning is likely to result in adverse consequences in 
terms of investment undertaken by multinationals in high-tax countries.  There is also 
evidence that such policies are likely to reinforce tax competition.72 
Notwithstanding the above, insofar as thin capitalization is concerned, empirical 
evidence only partially confirms these results.  Having also looked at this economic 
aspect of thin capitalization rules, the study conducted by T. Buettner’s team 
concluded that, no adverse effect could be found at investment level, i.e. the amount of 
capital invested is not lower in those countries which impose a thin capitalization rule.73  
It did, nevertheless, find evidence of decreased tax sensitivity as a result of application 
of thin capitalization rules.  This can constitute a significant limitation for the 
introduction of thin capitalization rules, in particular when read in light of, what has 
been designated as, “tax-rate-cut-cum-base broadening rule”:74 the tendency, witnessed 
amongst OECD countries, to reduce corporate tax rate,75 whilst at the same type 
introducing anti profit shifting rules.76  If thin capitalization rules do in fact reduce tax 
sensitivity, then the economic impact of potential corporate tax reductions would be 
limited.  Consequently, so too would the ability of Governments to stimulate the 
economy (by increasing foreign investment), through the introduction of those 
reductions.  The decrease of tax sensitivity should therefore constitute an important 
consideration by Member States intending to introduce thin capitalization rules. 
1.3 A thin capitalization rule for the CCCTB: an economic argument 
In terms of the CCCTB, the question then is whether any of the above should 
constitute an impediment to the introduction of a thin capitalization rule.  We do not 
believe so.  The above analysis has demonstrated that, introducing thin capitalization 
rules has positive effects in terms of their ability to curtail this form of international 
tax planning.  It has also highlighted that, although some concerns have been expressed 
                                                 
72 For one of the most recent studies on the matter, see S. Peralta et al, “Should countries control 
international profit shifting?” (2006) Journal of International Economics 68, 24-27. 
73 See CESifo Working Paper Series 2006, at p. 25.  The authors do, however, acknowledge that these 
results can be due to the decision to not to take into account certain factors in their calculations. 
74 See A. Haufler and G. Schjelderup, “Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting” (2000) 
Oxford Economic Papers 52(2), 306-325. 
75 For comprehensive analysis of the trend towards reducing corporate tax rates, see M. Devereux, 
“Developments in the Taxation of Corporate Profit in the OECD since 1965: Rates, Bases and Revenues”, 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 07/04, December 2006. 
76 This tendency has been closely connected to the increase in both capital mobility and the importance of 
multinational firms, see C. Fuest and T. Hemmelgarn, “Corporate tax policy, foreign firm ownership and 
thin capitalization” (2005) Regional Science and Urban Economics 35, 508-526. 
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over their potential impact on investment levels, the most recent empirical studies have 
failed to establish, in practical terms, a connection between thin capitalization rules 
and investment levels.  There are remaining concerns over an eventual decrease of tax 
sensitivity, as a result of the introduction of thin capitalization rules.  However, whilst 
this should most likely constitute, for the reasons set out above, a significant factor for 
individual Member States (or any other countries) to take into account, when 
considering the introduction of thin capitalization rules; in the context of the CCCTB, 
it should not be regarded as a decisive factor on the discussion over the introduction, or 
not, of these type of rules.  This conclusion is based on two fundamental considerations: 
first that, since it has already been demonstrated that thin capitalization rules are 
effective, their introduction will protect the tax base, and consequently revenues, both 
of which would otherwise be subject to erosion; second, and perhaps equally important, 
failure to include such rules could in itself give rise to much more significant economic 
distortions.  The first consideration is one, which is always at the forefront of individual 
countries decisions to introduce thin capitalization rules.  The second, however, is a 
consideration which is particular to the nature of the CCCTB. 
As regards this second consideration, one further point which should be noted is the 
fact that economic analysis seems to point towards the veracity of the following general 
preposition: in the presence of both foreign firm ownership and thin capitalization, 
countries gain from a coordinated broadening of the tax base,77 such as that facilitated 
by the introduction of thin capitalization rules.  More specifically, from the perspective 
of the operation of a consolidated corporate tax basis, the general consensus seems to 
be that common anti abuse provisions, such as thin capitalization rules, are necessary 
in order to ensure neutrality. 
As discussed above,78 at present Member States have very different approaches to thin 
capitalization.  Non-inclusion of a common thin capitalization rule within the context 
of the CCCTB could potentially mean that Member States would continue to apply 
their own provisions, as they currently stand.  Although this might seem an attractive 
practice from a pragmatic point of view, in practice, if different national rules are 
applicable, this would undeniably facilitate tax planning.  As C. Spengel and C. Wendt 
explain, in a very clear and uncontroversial fashion: “thin capitalization rules could be 
evaded if a company first grants a loan to a subsidiary resident in a country without 
thin capitalization rules, and afterwards this loan is directed to the relevant company 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 See point II above. 
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via intra-group transactions”.79  This is essentially made possible by the consolidated 
nature of the CCCTB: the fact that intra-group transactions will not be subject to tax.  
Ultimately therefore, maintaining application of national rules, to deal with different 
forms of international tax planning, would not only be non-neutral, but furthermore, 
failure to introduce common rules could result in severe economic distortions. 
Finally, authors have also highlighted to other problems failing to introduce common 
anti-abuse provisions, such as risks of double non-taxation and increased compliance 
costs (resulting from having to deal with different national anti-abuse provisions).80  In 
this context, therefore, there is a strong economic argument for the introduction of 
anti-avoidance provisions, such as a thin capitalization rule, in the context of the 
CCCTB. 
2. Legal Considerations 
If, from an economic point of view, thin capitalization rules do not seem to cause 
relevant adverse effects at the investment level, and are even recommended in order to 
avoid economic distortions, from a legal point of view, certain considerations must also 
be taken into account. In this respect, it is clear that options will have to be made, 
namely as regards the following: 
⎯ the option between either introducing a general anti abuse clause or specific anti 
abuse provisions (namely, the thin capitalization provision) within the CCCTB has 
to be justified; 
⎯ the object and scope of a thin capitalization rule within the CCCTB have to be 
determined, i.e., the qualifying groups under the CCCTB have to be identified and 
the meaning of a major shareholder for the purposes of applying a thin 
capitalization rule has to be determined; 
⎯ it also has to be decided whether to include a single thin capitalization regime or 
multiple thin capitalization regimes; 
⎯ the choice of basic method to determine the existence of thin capitalization, i.e. 
arm’s length principle, fixed debt/equity ratio or a combination of the two, has to 
be undertaken; 
                                                 
79 See “A Common Consolidated Tax Base for Multinational Companies in the European Union: Some 
Issues and Options”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 07/17, 
June 2007, at pp. 41-42. 
80 Ibid, at p. 42; see also J. Barenfeld, “A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European 
Union – A Beauty or a Best in the Quest for Tax Simplicity?” (2007) Bulletin for International Taxation 
6/7, 258-271, at p. 270. 
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⎯ the drafting of (a) thin capitalization regime(s) within the CCCTB has to be 
compatible with the EC Treaty fundamental freedoms and with the OECD 
requirements; and finally, 
⎯ simplicity and low compliance costs should not be forgotten. 
2.1 General anti-abuse clause vs. Specific anti-abuse provisions: the relevance of 
certainty and administrative simplicity, also taking into account ECJ case-law on 
fundamental freedoms 
As a starting point, and in our opinion, application of specific anti-abuse provisions 
would be preferable to the introduction of a general anti-abuse clause.  The reasons for 
this are two-fold: firstly not all Member States apply a general anti-abuse clause, and 
many of those that do have experienced difficulties in their application; secondly, 
application, by different Member States, of a general anti-abuse clause would in 
practice entail a broad level of discretion, potentially leading to diverging standards of 
application and consequent economic distortions.  Thus, even if the ECJ was to 
contribute to clarification of its scope of application, such a general clause would 
ultimately prove to be a significant source of legal uncertainty.  In comparison to a 
general anti-abuse clause, therefore, specific anti-abuse clauses will have the benefit of 
providing higher levels of certainty, as well as being, most likely, simpler to administer. 
It should, however, be noted that the application of specific anti-abuse clauses to 
situations, which fall within the scope of EC law, and namely of Article 43 of the EC 
Treaty, is subject to limitations.  As the Court has consistently reiterated in recent 
rulings, these clauses are only permissible under EC law, insofar as they allow for “the 
consideration of objective and verifiable elements in order to determine whether a 
transaction represents a purely artificial arrangement” – i.e., they cannot constitute 
irrefutable presumptions.81  Any thin capitalization rule applicable under the CCCTB, 
which will cover situations falling within the scope of Article 43 of the EC Treaty,82 will 
have to respect these requirements.  In practice though, and from an administrative 
                                                 
81 See ECJ 13 March 2007, C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue, [2007] ECR I-2107 (hereafter “Thin Cap Group Litigation”), at pars 81-82; and 
Lammers, at pars 28-29.  See also, ECJ 12 September 2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [2006] ECR I-7995 (hereafter “Cadbury 
Schweppes”, at pars 65 and 75. The recent ruling in Columbus Container Services does not change this 
case-law, see ECJ 6 December 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Container Services BVBA & CO vs. Finanzamt 
Bielefeld Innenstadt.  For a commentary to this case see T. O’Shea, “German CFC Rules Compatible with 
EU Law, ECJ Says” (2007) Tax Notes International December, 1-5. 
82 Essentially this will occur most where the companies involved are resident within the EU, but  outside 
the CCCTB, i.e. non-consolidated related EU companies, see European Commission’s Working Papers: 
CCCTB\WP\041, at p. 3; and Summary Record of the Meeting of the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base Working Group – Meeting Held in Brussels on 27-28 September 2007, CCCTB/WP/059, 13 
November 2007, at pp. 8-9.  See also point III.2.2 below for a more comprehensive analysis of the scope 
of Article 43 of the EC Treaty, as interpreted by the ECJ. 
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perspective, providing evidence as to “valid commercial justifications underlying a 
loan”, will undeniably result in increased complexity as regards the application of such 
a rule. 
In this respect, it will be necessary to establish criteria in order to determine: which tax 
administration would be in charge of ascertaining whether there is a purely artificial 
arrangement underlying the loan; or, more generally, criteria for determining which 
would be the competent authority for controlling application of thin capitalization rules 
to the Group’s loans.  It seems to result from the Commission paper on the “elements 
of the administrative framework”, that two possibilities are available in this respect:83 
either the principal tax administration,84 or the tax administration of the borrowing 
company within the Group.  The first option would appear to offer the most benefits.  
Not only would the application of the principal tax administration criteria most likely 
result in a simpler and more coherent application of the thin capitalization rule where a 
Group is concerned; but, equally, if the amount of deductible interest (and the level of 
the borrowing) is to be done on a consolidated basis (not taking into account every 
single company or PE belonging to the Group), application of the thin capitalization 
rule by the principal tax administration seems to be the adequate solution. 
In any event, and notwithstanding the above, specific anti-abuse provisions remain 
simpler to administrate, when compared to general anti-abuse clauses, and thus 
represent the better solution, in our view, insofar as the CCCTB is concerned.  
Moreover, and specifically as regards thin capitalization, the provision can, and will 
most likely be applied by self-assessment, albeit subject to tax administration control, 
therefore further facilitating its practical application. 
2.2 The object and scope of a thin capitalization rule within the CCCTB 
In order to draft a thin capitalization rule, we also need to establish what should be its 
object and scope. Thus, we need to identify the different CCCTB qualifying groups and 
some of the hypothetical cases that will be covered by the aforementioned rule. The 
general assumption outlined by the Commission in its technical document – i.e., that 
consolidation will be mandatory for all companies qualifying and opting for the 
CCCTB, which have a qualifying subsidiary or a PE in another State in the EU (the 
all-in all-out principle) – is accepted here.85. 
The aim here is to establish whether, and how, a thin capitalization regime would 
apply to each of these groups. 
                                                 
83 See CCCTB: possible elements of the administrative framework, CCCTB/WP/061, 13 November 2007. 
84 See for the concept of principal tax administration, ibid at p. 7, pars 23 et seq. 
85 See CCCTB: possible elements of a technical outline – Annotated, CCCTB\WP57, 20 November 2007, 
at pars 85-86. 
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2.2.1 CCCTB Qualifying Groups and hypothetical loan finance cases 
The groups described below correspond to the ones identified in the Commission 
working paper on the possible elements of a technical outline;86 whilst, the hypothetical 
cases of loan finance are inspired in the ones analysed by the Court in Thin Cap Group 
Litigation. 
 
(A) Group comprises an EU resident parent company and its EU subsidiaries and PEs, 
regardless of whether or not the EU resident parent is controlled by a non-EU parent 
company 
CASE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If company 2 (or company 3, or even the PE) takes up loans from company 1, the issue 
is whether interest is always deductible in MS A or MS B. 
Outbound dividends paid to company 1 will probably be withheld in MS A, if the issue 
is not considered to be covered by the free movement of capital, but exclusively by the 
                                                 
86 See ibid at pp. 21-23, in particular at pars 87-88. 
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freedom of establishment, and as the latter one is not applicable to Third States.87 The 
fact that company 3 will not directly pay dividends to company 1, as these will be paid 
to company 2 and therefore MS B cannot tax those dividends under the parent 
subsidiary directive, does not justify that MS B prohibits deduction of interest directly 
paid by company 3 or the PE to company 1.  As a general rule, taxation at arm’s 
length of outbound dividends paid to a major shareholder resident in a Third State, 
makes deduction at arm’s length of outbound interest paid to parent companies (or 
major shareholders) resident in Third States consistent with the concept of taxation of 
net income.  
It should be stressed, that the Commission’s view on this matter appears to be that 
even in case of exemption of inbound dividends from major shareholdings, “interest on 
loans taken up for the acquisition of such shareholdings should in principle be 
deductible”, as “[t]o deny interest deductions would make the CCCTB extremely 
unattractive for EU groups with subsidiaries outside the EU”.88  Thus, as a rule, 
interest paid to a non-resident major shareholder will be deducted. 
Let us now assume that company 1 provides a loan finance to company 2, and 
company 4 provides another loan finance to company 3. 
A thin capitalization rule, regarding interest paid by a resident company (“the 
borrowing company”), applies only to situations where the lending company has a 
definite influence on the financing decisions of the borrowing company, or is itself 
controlled by a company that has such an influence.89  Thus, thin capitalization rules 
primarily affect the freedom of establishment and are to be considered in the light of 
Article 43 (and 48) of the EC Treaty.90  As company 1 is resident in a Third State, it 
does not fall under the scope of Article 43. 
Regarding the loan provided by company 4 to company 3, let us first assume, that 
company 4 has a share of 25% in company 3 and a definite influence on its decisions.  
A thin capitalization regime applicable to the interest paid to company 4, is covered 
under Article 43, and therefore, in this case, the doctrine in Lankhorst-Hohorst and in 
Thin Cap Group Litigation is applicable. 
                                                 
87 See ECJ 10 May 2007, C-492/04, Lasertec Gesellschaft für Stanzformen mbH v Finanzamt 
Emmendingen, at par 28 and ECJ, 24 May 2007, C-157/05, Winfried L. Holböck v Finanzamt Salzburg-
Land, at par 22-24.  For an analysis of the implications of these and other recent cases on the application 
of fundamental freedoms to third countries, see A. Cordewener et al, “Free Movement of Capital and 
Third Countries: Exploring the Outer Boundaries with Lasertec, A and B and Holbock” (2007) European 
Taxation 8/9, 371-376. 
88 See CCCTB/WP061, at par 130. 
89 Thin Cap Group Litigation, at par 31. 
90 Ibid. 
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Let us now assume, that company 4 does not itself have a controlling shareholding in 
the borrowing company 3.  According to paragraph 98 of Thin Cap Group Litigation, 
“Article 43 has … no bearing on the application of national legislation such as the 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings [a thin cap rule] to a situation in which a 
resident company is granted a loan by a company which is resident in another Member 
State and which does not itself have a controlling shareholding in the borrowing 
company, and where each of those companies is directly or indirectly controlled by a 
common parent company which is resident, for its part, in a non-member country”.91 
This is the case, where the Member State does not apply a thin capitalization rule to 
this situation.  Otherwise, the meaning of controlling shareholding would have to be 
determined according to the Member States’ criteria. 
(B) It also comprises: Group of EU resident subsidiaries under the common control of a non-
EU resident parent 
CASE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the ruling in Thin Cap Group Litigation upon the 
protection of third countries on the basis of the fundamental freedoms, see C. HJI Panayi, “Thin 
Capitalization Glo et al. – A Thinly Concealed Agenda?” (2007) Intertax 35(5), 298-309.  See also, R. 
Fontana, “Direct Investments and Third Countries: Things are Finally Moving… in the Wrong Direction” 
(2007) European Taxation 10, 431-436. 
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In this case, the PE provides a loan finance to company 2 and let us assume 2 
situations: 
1. Company 3 does not itself have a controlling shareholding in the borrowing 
company.  As with the above mentioned case, this situation is not protected under 
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
2. Company 3 holds 75% of company 2 (and company 1 holds 25% of company 2). It 
results from paragraph 100 (paragraphs 99-102) of the Thin Cap Group Litigation a 
contrario, that this situation is protected under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty. 
 
 (C) Group of EU resident subsidiaries under the common control of a non-EU resident parent 
even if the ownership chain of a group of EU companies includes a non-EU link company 
(the so-called ‘sandwich’ situation). 
CASE 3 
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In this case, company 2 grants a loan to company 3. According to paragraph 95 of the 
Thin Cap Group Litigation, this situation is protected under Articles 43 and 48 of the 
EC Treaty. 
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(D) It covers PEs in two MS of a non-EU resident company group and a PE and subsidiary in 
two MS of a non-EU resident company or group. 
CASE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, company 1 grants a loan to the PE in MS B. The situation is outside the 
scope of the EC Treaty, as indirectly results from par 100 of the Thin Cap Group 
Litigation and para 25-28 of Lasertec. 
2.3 The meaning of major shareholder for the purpose of a thin capitalization regime 
within the CCCTB 
Departing from the described CCCTB Qualifying Groups, and in order to further 
determine the object of the thin capitalization rule, it will also be necessary to define, 
in a manner which is compatible with the EC Treaty, what constitutes a “major 
shareholder” for the purposes of a thin capitalization rule within the CCCTB.  In 
particular, consideration should be given as to, which of the following criteria, would be 
the most preferable to apply: 
1) The criterion adopted in the CCCTB, i.e. at least 75%; 
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2) The definition of “parent company”, as set out in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive;92 
3) The criterion of associated enterprises, as set out in the Arbitration Convention,93 
or in the OECD Model Convention; or, 
4) The ECJ case law based criterion of “definite influence”, defined in Thin Cap 
Group Litigation as: “where the two companies in question are subject to common 
control in the sense that one of them participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of the other company concerned or a third party 
participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of both the 
other companies concerned”.94 
Adopting the CCCTB criterion of at least 75% would, not only be a simple solution, 
but equally one that would most likely contribute to the overall cohesion of the regime 
(one single threshold).  However, it might also be too narrow, in order to achieve the 
anti-abuse purpose of a thin capitalization rule, which is normally applicable to 
associated enterprises. 
Adopting the formal criterion of the parent-subsidiary Directive (15% lowering to 10%), 
on the other hand, although also capable of bringing simplicity and certainty, would 
nevertheless depart too much from the CCCTB Group meaning, and be too broad and 
too formal.  It may also be incompatible with the ECJ case law.  Applying a fixed 
threshold to any shareholder holding at least 15% of the Group shares would constitute 
an irrefutable presumption, and as such, might be considered contrary to the ECJ case 
law, which requires a case-by-case analysis of the meaning of abuse.95  This would seem 
to be the case, regardless of the fact that thin capitalization rule would (have to) be 
applicable to domestic, EU and Third States’ major shareholders, in order to avoid 
being discriminatory.  Alternatively, a fixed threshold could be accompanied by the 
possibility of giving evidence that the holding does neither signify a direct nor an 
indirect control. 
Looking at the thin capitalization rules applicable by the Member States, we can see 
that different thresholds are adopted to define associated companies: direct or indirect 
                                                 
92 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ L 225, 20.8.1990, p. 6, as last 
amended by Council Directive 2006/98/EC of 20 November 2006 adapting certain Directives in the field 
of taxation, by reason of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ L 363, 20.12.2006, p. 129 (hereafter 
“Arbitration Convention”). 
93 Convention 90/463/EEC of 23 July 1990, OJ L 225, 20.8.1990, p. 10. 
94 See also ECJ 13 April 2000, C-251/98, C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst 
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, [2000] ECR I-2787 (hereafter Baars), at par 22. 
95 For an analysis of the meaning of abuse within the ECJ case law, see R. de la Feria, “Prohibition Of 
Abuse of (Community) Law – The Creation of a New General Principle of EC Law Through Tax?” 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP07/23, December 2007. 
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ownership of more than 50% of the share capital (Denmark, France, Lithuania); 33% 
(The Netherlands); 25% (the previous German regime, Italy, Poland, Slovenia); 10% 
(Portugal); 75% (Ireland).96  The Commission’s documentation regarding the CCCTB 
does not focus on this point, and therefore it is unclear whether Member States’ 
agreement on such threshold would be easily reached. 
Introducing a definition of associated enterprises would probably result in some level of 
legal uncertainty from a taxpayers’ perspective, as it would entail a case-by-case 
analysis of the set requirements.  It would however be preferable to adopting the 
“definite influence” criterion,97 as set out by the ECJ – which in itself is rather vague 
and thus of difficult application – unless it was subject to further clarification, in order 
to reduce its indeterminacy.98 
Consequently, and in light of the above, applying a thin capitalization rule at arm’s 
length criteria to associated enterprises, as defined in the Arbitration Convention and 
in the ECJ case-law, appears to be a consistent, and possibly the best solution.  Such 
definition of associated enterprises could be compiled by a fixed threshold (for example 
25%), with a reversal of the burden of proof, if agreement amongst Member States 
could be reached. 
2.4 One thin capitalization regime vs. Multiple thin capitalization regimes 
In light of what has already been said, in theory, the CCCTB could potentially include 
four different thin capitalization regimes. 
A first regime aimed at situations in which EC law, and in particular the freedom of 
establishment, is not applicable (see cases 1, 2 and 4 above); but, nevertheless, both the 
OECD’s commentaries on Article 9 of the OECD Model, and the OECD’s guidelines as 
regards transfer pricing, will still apply.99  This rule could then be sub-divided into two 
others: one, applicable to situations involving a parent company resident in a Third 
State, which adopts a clearly more favourable tax regime, and which does not engage in 
exchange of information (in which case, a thin capitalization rule, drafted as an 
irrefutable presumption, could be applied); and a second one, applicable to situations 
involving a parent company resident in a Third State, which albeit falling outside the 
scope of the freedom of establishment, falls within the scope of transfer pricing rules 
established under bilateral tax treaties. 
                                                 
96 See point 2 and Table 1 above. 
97 See Thin Cap Group Litigation, at par 27. 
98 As exemplified in ibid, at par 31. 
99 See Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations OECD, Paris, 
(1995). 
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A third regime targeted at situations falling within the scope of the EC Treaty, namely 
where the lending parent company is resident in a Member State not adopting the 
CCCTB (assuming that Member States will have an opt-out choice).  In which case, 
the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling would be applicable. 
Finally, a fourth regime aimed at situations falling within the scope of the EC Treaty 
and the CCCTB (where either the lending company, or PE, or the parent company of 
the borrowing company belonging to the CCCTB Group, is resident in a Member 
State).100 
Alternatively, a single thin capitalization regime could be adopted, which would deal 
with all of the above described situations.  Were this to be the case, this single regime 
would have to comply with, both EC law requirements (despite the fact that EC 
fundamental freedoms have no bearing on the application of CCCTB rules); and, 
regarding issues not (yet) covered by EC law, the OECD commentaries and guidelines 
(insofar as they are not incompatible with EC law).101  This would seem to constitute a 
much simpler solution, both from the perspective of tax administrations, and from that 
of CCCTB Groups, as it would substantially reduce potential administrative and 
compliance costs. 102 
2.5 Pure arms’ length approach vs. Combined arms’ length / fixed ratio approach 
In principle, a thin capitalization rule for the CCCTB could follow one of the three 
methods, usually adopted for determining the existence of thin capitalization: the arms’ 
length principle, a debt/equity fixed ratio, or a conjugation of both.103  Different factors 
militate in favour of the adoption of the arms’ length method.  Firstly, it is clear from 
the Commission’s CCCTB documentation that arms’ length would seem to constitute 
the preferred approach to deal with thin capitalization. 
                                                 
100 It is interesting to note that not all countries applying a corporate consolidated tax basis, apply a thin 
capitalization rule to this group of situations: Canada, for example, does not apply a provincial thin 
capitalization rule (disallowing interest expense incurred on indebtedness to a non-provincial 
corporations), although it applies one as regards international transactions, see J. Mintz, “Corporate Tax 
Harmonization in Europe: It’s All About Compliance”, (2004) International Tax and Public Finance 11, 
221-234, at p. 225. 
101 For an early assessment of the compatibility of thin capitalization rules with the OECD Model 
Convention, see G.M.M. Michielse, “Treaty Aspects of Thin Capitalization” (1997) Bulletin of 
International for International Taxation 12, 565-573. 
102 This position is also in line with W. Hellerstein and C McLure comments that, whatever the reasons 
why companies are not included within the scope of the CCCTB it “should not matter”, as “in all 
instances, the excluded affiliate is effectively a ‘stranger’ for the CCBT group, and we see no reason as a 
matter for principle why the CCTB should treat these ‘strangers’ differently”, in “The European 
Commission's Report on Company Taxation: What the EU can Learn from the experience of the US 
States” (2004) International Tax and Public Finance 11, 199-220, at p. 206. 
103 See point 2 above. 
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“[T]hin capitalization which would apply to inward investment from non-
consolidated related companies (EU and third countries) would be governed by the 
general arms’ length principles (ALP) applied (i) interest and (ii) the amount of 
debts.  However, comments on whether the latter condition (the AL borrowing 
capacity of a company) could be considered too complicated to be assessed in 
practice were requested.”104 
Secondly, a pure debt/equity fixed ratio (unless it allows for consideration of “objective 
and verifiable elements”) would most likely be deemed incompatible with EC law, in 
particular with Article 43 EC Treaty as interpreted by the ECJ in Thin Cap Group 
Litigation.105  In this regard, it is interesting to note that in this ruling, the Court refers 
specifically to arms’ length principles, stating that national thin capitalization rules can 
only be justified by the need to combat abusive practices if, and insofar as, the interest 
paid by a resident subsidiary to a non-resident parent company “exceeds what those 
companies would have agreed upon on an arm’s length basis”.106  The manner of this 
reference seems to indicate that, from a fundamental freedoms perspective, the Court 
too would favour this type of approach in order to deal with thin capitalization. 
Finally, the OECD has also expressed preference for what it designates as “flexible thin 
capitalization rules”, i.e. those which are able to take into account individual 
circumstances of taxpayers.107 Significantly, this preference has been attributed 
precisely to the need “to accommodate its findings that any domestic thin 
capitalization rules must be consistent with the arm’s length principle”.108 
Notwithstanding the above, and in practice, the adoption of purely arm’s length 
principles to deal with thin capitalization issues is not unproblematic.  The most 
significant concern is the fact that it is, by its own nature, subjective and thus has the 
potential to give rise to high levels of legal uncertainty.  In the United Kingdom, where 
a similar approach has been in place since 2004,109 there is significant evidence of this 
fact.  In light of these difficulties, in June 2007, the United Kingdom tax authorities 
issued a consultation paper with the aim of reviewing its transfer pricing regime (of 
which, as discussed above, the thin capitalization rules are part).  By their own 
admission, the regime has the potential to “impose significant compliance burden on 
companies to demonstrate, by assembling evidence, that arm’s length results have been 
                                                 
104 See CCCTB/WP/059, at p. 9; see also CCCTB/WP/041, at pp. 7-8. 
105 See point III.1.1 above. 
106 Thin Cap Group Litigation, at par 80.  The same language was used by the Court recently in Lammers, 
at par 30. 
107 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. 
108 See A.M.C. Smith and P.V. Dunmore, “New Zealand’s Thin Capitalization Rules and the Arm’s 
Length Principle” (2003) Bulletin for International Taxation 10, 503-510, at p. 505. 
109 See point II.1.3.16 above. 
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used”; as well as to “involve complex analysis and specialist knowledge which can make 
disputes difficult and lengthy to resolve”.110  In fact, previous informal consultations 
with companies, professional advisors and other interested parties had already indicated 
that “the cost of complying with transfer pricing rules was an even greater concern for 
businesses than the time taken to resolve enquiries”; and that “the main concern for 
businesses involved knowing what sort of evidence HMRC would find acceptable and 
how to apply a risk based approach in assembling it”.111  These findings are in line with 
previous surveys, undertaken by the European Commission, which highlight the 
significance of transfer pricing issues, in the context of compliance costs for EU groups 
of companies.112 
In the context of the CCCTB, these problems have the potential to be significantly 
exacerbated.  The subjective nature of the arm’s length principle would leave a wide 
discretion to Member States as regards its application.  The potentially emerging 
discrepancies could result in precisely the same type of economic distortions that the 
CCCTB is aimed at eliminating.113  If, therefore, the flexibility provided by the arm’s 
length approach constitutes its biggest advantage, it can also be regarded as it greatest 
weakness. It is important to keep in mind that, the CCCTB aims precisely at avoiding 
the disadvantages of the transfer pricing methodology within the EU. 
In light of the above, we believe that the best solution, in order to deal with thin 
capitalization in the context of the CCCTB, would be one which encapsulates the 
benefits of the arm’s length approach, but mitigates its disadvantages.  We therefore 
propose the adoption of a hybrid method, similar to those already in use within several 
countries,114 which combines arm’s length principles with the adoption of a fixed 
debt/equity ratio, and where the latter acts as a safe harbour.115 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 HM Revenue & Customs, HMRC Approach to Transfer Pricing for Large Business, Consultation 
Document, 20 June 2007, at p. 6, available at: http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/. 
111 Ibid, at pp. 7-8. 
112 B.J.M. Terra and P.J. Wattel, European Tax Law, Fourth Edition, Kluwer Law International (2005), at 
pp. 577 et seq. 
113 See C. Spengel and C. Wendt, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, 
2007, at pp. 1 and 8; and European Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, COM(2001) 582 final, 23 October 2001, at p. 10. 
114 E.g. New Zealand, see A.M.C. Smith and P.V. Dunmore, Bulletin for International Taxation 2003. 
115 In the United Kingdom, the introduction of safe harbours, in the context of the review of the transfer 
pricing regime, has been subject to debate.  Although acknowledging that such a measure would “provide 
certainty to companies”, the tax authorities have however come out strongly against its introduction, see 
HM Revenue & Customs, HMRC Approach to Transfer Pricing for Large Business, at pp. 12-13. 
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3. Proposal for a Thin Capitalization Rule within the CCCTB: Main Guidelines 
In light of the above, and insofar as combined EC law and OECD requirements provide 
adequate protection against abusive practices involving Third States, we propose the 
following: 
⎯ adoption within the scope of the CCCTB of a specific anti-abuse provision to deal 
with thin capitalization, rather than the adoption of a general anti-abuse clause; 
⎯ adoption of a single thin capitalization regime, rather than multiple thin 
capitalization regimes applicable to different factual circumstances; 
⎯ adoption of a hybrid arms’ length / fixed ratio approach in order to establish the 
existence of thin capitalization, rather than either a strict arm’s length principle 
approach, or a fixed debt/equity ratio. 
If the proposed solution is adopted, drafting of a thin capitalization regime should still 
observe the following conditions: 
1. Be compatible with EC law, and in particular EC Treaty provisions on the 
fundamental freedoms, as interpreted by the ECJ in the Lankhorst-Hohorst and 
Thin Cap Group Litigation rulings, and the OECD commentaries and guidelines on 
the matter. 
2. The above would mean in practice that application of the thin capitalization regime 
should result in principle, in the deductibility of interest, but the proposed regime 
should also allow verification of specific factors, namely: 
2.1 Whether the loan can be regarded as a loan, or should be regarded as some 
other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital; 
2.2 Whether the loan would have been made if it were at arm’s length; 
2.3 Whether the amount of the loan itself observes arm’s length conditions; 
2.4 Whether the amount of interest paid observes arm’s length amount (what 
would have been agreed at arm’s length between the parties and between the 
parties and a third party). 
3. In case of re-characterisation of interest as profits, these should correspond to the 
profits that would have accrued at arm’s length. 
4. Reversal of the burden of proof is not only acceptable, but arguably required, in 
light of the practicability principle, as long as the administrative compliance 
requirements are not disproportionate. 
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5. Allow for the possibility of providing evidence as to any commercial justification for 
the transactions, without being subject to any undue administrative constraints. 
6. Be simple, in order to ensure low compliance costs (for example, the interest 
deduction limitations may be excluded to small transactions). 
7. Express cross-reference to the OECD commentaries and guidelines is advisable, in 
order to avoid a regime that is too detailed, and thus too complex. 
8. Express cross-reference to the Arbitration Convention, as regards situations covered 
under Article 43 of the EC Treaty, but not under the CCCTB. 
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